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Nicholas Wade and Race: Building a Scientiﬁc Façade
Jennifer Rafff 1

A Troublesome Inheritance: Genes, Race and Human History, by Nicholas Wade. New York: Penguin Press,
2014. x + 278 pp. 978-1-5942-0446-3 (hardcover). US $27.95.

For he will say to himself that he has no right to
give names to objects which he cannot defĳine.
—Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man

D

o “races” exist as meaningful biological
categories?1 Physical anthropologists and
human biologists have been studying race
(e.g., blacks vs. whites, or Europeans vs. Asians) for
centuries. For most of that time they subscribed to
the perspective that race was a taxonomic category,
and they sought to identify the biological traits
(e.g., cranial shape or skin color) that characterized
and defĳined these diffferent groups. This perspective
assumed that each individual was a member of a
single racial category, that the diffferences between
racial categories were biological, and that these categories were predictive of other traits like ancestry,
temperament, intelligence, or health (Linnaeus
1758; Morton 1839; Hooton 1939).
But it gradually became clear that this classifĳicatory approach was not scientifĳically sound.
Grouping people by skin color into “continental
races” (Africans, Asians, Europeans) did not produce the same result as grouping people by skull
shape or by such traits as susceptibility to sickle
cell disease (Livingstone 1962; Relethford 2009).
Furthermore, as scientists began to study human
variation with the tools of genetics, it became
obvious that human genetic variation does not
divide humans into a few discrete groups. There are
virtually no sharp boundaries, either with physical

features or with patterns of genetic diversity, that
show where one population “ends” and the next
“begins” (Livingstone 1962; Lewontin 1972; Jorde
et al. 2000; Relethford 2009; Long et al. 2009;
Templeton 2013).
These observations have led the majority of
physical anthropologists, human biologists, human
geneticists, and sociologists in recent decades to
conclude that the racial groups we recognize are
social categories constructed in a specifĳic cultural
and historical setting, even if we consider physical features when categorizing people (Pigliucci
2013; Duster 2005). These social categories have
biological consequences; for example, someone
who experiences the stress of racism may be more
likely to develop high blood pressure and hypertension than someone who does not (Gravlee 2009;
Sullivan 2013).
However, according to former New York Times
science writer Nicholas Wade, we should never
have stopped thinking of race as a biological
taxonomic category. In his book A Troublesome
Inheritance, Wade takes it upon himself to educate
scientists about the errors of our interpretations of
human genetic diversity.
Wade claims that the latest genomic fĳindings
actually support dividing humans into discrete
races and that the genetic makeup of diffferent
races contributes to behavioral and economic disparities. In a spectacular failure of logic, he asserts
that those who disagree that races are meaningful
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Table 1. Various Numbers of Races Referred to by Wade in A Troublesome Inheritance
Number of Races

Deﬁnition

Page

3

Africans, East Asians, Europeans, “as well as many smaller groups”

2

3

Africans, East Asians, Caucasians (doesn’t mention Native Americans)

5

Africans, East Asians, Caucasians, Native Americans, Australians/Papua New Guineans

4
64

3

Caucasians, East Asians, Africans

70

7

Five continental races, Indian subcontinent, people of the Middle East

96

5 or 7

Five continental groups but two additional groups recognized genetically: Central/Southern Asia and Middle East

100

4

European, East Asian, American Indian, African

115

3

“Major races”

121

5

“Major races”
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biological categories in humans must also think
that human populations do not difffer genetically
or have not been afffected by evolution.
There is a lot to criticize in this book, particularly Wade’s imaginative storytelling in chapters
6–10 (“a much more speculative arena,” as he puts
it [15]). He explains that English populations have a
“willingness to save and delay gratifĳication,” which
“seems considerably weaker in tribal societies”
(184–185), and these diffferences must be genetically based, despite his admission that “the genetic
underpinnings of human social behavior are for
the most part still unknown” (15). In chapter 8,
he asserts that Jews are adapted for capitalism in
a manner analogous to the Eskimo’s adaptation
to survival in an Arctic environment (214)—an
assertion unsupported by scientifĳic evidence,
to put it mildly. (Wade seems to be unaware of
the consequences of laws prohibiting Jews from
owning land and farming over much of Europe
for centuries—and instead speculates that “the
adaptation of Jews to capitalism is another such
evolutionary process” [214].)
But the central foundation of Wade’s argument is the scientifĳic justifĳication of the folk
classifĳication of race. He writes: “At least at the
level of continental populations, races can be
distinguished genetically, and this is sufffĳicient to
establish that they exist” (122). If Wade is right and
races are distinct biological categories, then we
would reasonably expect that they would be unambiguously diffferent from each other genetically
and physically (as well as behaviorally, according
to Wade). One should be able to defĳine each race
with a set of objective criteria, which could be used
by any person to independently reach the same
classifĳications (and number of classifĳications) as

Wade. Furthermore, these categories should have
predictive power; that is, features that defĳine race
should be in concordance with new discoveries of
genetic diversity.

What Is Race, According to Wade?
Wade never provides a clear defĳinition of “race” in
this book. He tries to rely instead on loose associations rather than defĳinitive characteristics, which
forces him (like Hooton 1918, 1931) to conclude
both that physical traits defĳine race but that the
traits can vary from person to person: “Races are
identifĳied by clusters of traits, and to belong to a
certain race, it’s not necessary to possess all of the
identifying traits” (121).
With such a shifty, casual footing, it’s no surprise that Wade’s conclusions are unsound. He
can’t keep the number of races straight (see Table
1). Wade can’t settle on a defĳinite number of races
because he can’t come up with a consistent, rigorous defĳinition of what “race” means. He freely uses
such terms as “major race,” “race,” “subrace,” “group,”
and “population” but doesn’t provide any serious,
objective ways to distinguish among these terms
for arbitrary groupings of people.2
Wade seems to realize the contradictory claims
of his premise but tries to have it both ways: “Such
an arrangement, of portioning human variation
into fĳive continental races, is to some extent arbitrary. But it makes practical sense. The three major
races are easy to recognize. The fĳive-way division
matches the known events of human population
history. And, most signifĳicant of all, the division by
continent is supported by genetics” (94).
To support this claim, Wade relies heavily on
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a study published by Rosenberg et al. (2002) that
used a program called Structure to group people
based on similarities in short tandem repeat markers distributed across the genome. He notes that
the program identifĳied fĳive major clusters in this
2002 study, which corresponded to the major
geographic regions of the world (Africa, Eurasia,
East Asia, Oceania, and America). Therefore, Wade
argues, these results clearly show that humans
are divided up into racial categories that match
continents.
Charles Murray, coauthor with Richard Herrnstein of the book The Bell Curve (1994)—which
claimed that genetically based diffferences in
intelligence between blacks and whites (as measured by IQ) could explain social and economic
disparities, and was widely criticized (see Alland
et al. 1996)—recently reviewed Wade’s book in the
Wall Street Journal. He stated that “a computer given
a random sampling of bits of DNA that are known
to vary among humans—from among the millions
of them—will cluster them into groups that correspond to the self-identifĳied race or ethnicity of the
subjects. This is not because the software assigns the
computer that objective but because those are the
clusters that provide the best statistical fĳit” (Murray 2014) But Wade and Murray are both wrong.
While the program Structure can be a useful tool
for inferring individual ancestry, it requires (1) an
understanding of the assumptions inherent in the
clustering algorithms and (2) cautious interpretation of the results. Because of these caveats, careful
and rigorous scientists generally view the “best”
clustering scheme as a starting point for generating
testable hypotheses about ancestry and population
history, not as the basis for slicing the species into a
discrete number of groups or races.
Structure is a program that assigns individual
genotypes to hypothetical populations or ancestry
groupings (Bolnick 2008). It assumes that populations are in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium and that
loci are not in linkage disequilibrium (Pritchard
et al. 2000). Results produced from this analytical
tool are extremely sensitive to a number of factors,
including models (i.e., correlated vs. uncorrelated
allele frequencies), the type and number of genetic
variants studied, and the number of populations
included in the analysis (Rosenberg et al. 2005).
The authors of Structure also caution that it will
produce rather arbitrary clusters when sampled
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populations exhibit clinal patterns of genetic variation due to isolation by distance (Pritchard et al.
2000). This description applies to most human
populations, so it makes the results of Structure
problematic and difffĳicult to interpret in many
cases. In fact, Rosenberg et al. (2005) explicitly
stated: “Our evidence for clustering should not be
taken as evidence of our support of any particular
concept of ‘biological race.’”
Contrary to Wade’s assertion, Structure didn’t
simply identify fĳive clusters in the Rosenberg et al.
(2002) data set. It also identifĳied two, three, four,
six, and seven clusters.3 Why? Researchers using
Structure have to defĳine the number (K) of clusters in advance, because that’s what the program
requires. So where does Wade get the idea that K
= 5 is the most statistically supported number of
clusters? Not from Rosenberg et al. (2002).
There are a few statistical methods for identifying which choice of K is “best.” Structure itself
provides an estimate of the log probability of the
data for each value of K [lnP(D)]. However, using
this estimate to choose among values of K is not
without some controversy—the authors of Structure caution that it “merely provides an ad hoc approximation” and the “biological interpretation of
K may not be straightforward” (Pritchard et al. 2010:
15). In their simulation study, Evanno et al. (2005)
observed that lnP(D) wasn’t necessarily maximized
at the correct value for K. They recommend instead
the measure of ΔK, or the second-order rate of
change of the likelihood function with respect to
K (essentially, how much better each value of K is
compared with the preceding value of K). Many
researchers follow this practice, although it has
been argued against (Waples and Gaggiotti 2006).
Importantly, Rosenberg et al. (2002, 2005)
do not report the lnP(D) (or ΔK) for any of the
values for K, so those articles do not tell us which
number of clusters are most likely present in the
data set. Bolnick (2008) reports information about
the unpublished lnP(D) values:
No single value of K clearly maximized the probability of the observed data. Probabilities increased
sharply from K = 1 to K = 4 but were fairly similar for
values of K ranging from 4 to 20. The probability
of the observed data was higher for K = 6 than for
smaller values of K, but not as high for some replicates of larger values of K. The highest Pr (X|K) was
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associated with a particular replicate of K = 16, but
that value of K was also associated with very low
probabilities when the individuals were grouped
into 16 clusters in other ways. Consequently it is
uncertain which number of genetic clusters best
fĳits this data set, but there is no clear evidence
that K = 6 is the best estimate. (Bolnick 2008,
77; based on information provided by personal
communication from N. Rosenberg)

Wade does not seem to have read any of the papers critical of interpretations of Rosenberg et
al.’s (2002) data as evidence for human racial divisions, such as Bolnick (2008) or Templeton (2013).
Nor does he seem to have noticed Rosenberg et
al.’s (2002) omission of any statistical evaluation
of the diffferent K values. They do highlight “six
main genetic clusters, fĳive of which correspond
to major geographic regions” within the abstract,
making one wonder whether Wade carefully read
the rest of the paper. I would like to believe that a
veteran science reporter would not be so cavalier
as to selectively read only sources that support
his position. Wade evidently seems to like K = 5
simply because it matches the number of inhabited
continents: “It might be reasonable to elevate the
Indian and Middle Eastern groups to the level of
major races, making seven in all. But then many
more subpopulations could be declared races, so
to keep things simple, the fĳive-race, continentbased scheme seems the most practical for most
purposes” (100). Practical. Simple. Wade wants
us to cut up human diversity into fĳive races not
because that’s what the statistical analyses support
but because thinking about it as a gradient is hard.
Nobody (least of all contributors to this
journal!) is denying that humans vary physically
and genetically. But observed patterns of human
genetic diversity simply don’t fĳit with any scientifĳically viable defĳinition of race as a taxonomic
unit (Templeton 2013). In order to fĳind biological
support for folk classifĳications of race, Wade has
decided that certain patterns of variation are more
important than others. The fĳive-part division of
races seems “logical” to Wade because there are
fĳive continents. Anticipating confusion on this
point, he claims: “Those who assert that human
races don’t exist like to point to the many, mutually inconsistent classifĳication schemes that have
recognized anywhere from 3 to 60 races. But the

lack of agreement doesn’t mean that races don’t
exist, only that it is a matter of judgment as to how
to defĳine them” (92, emphasis mine).
So, rather than being defĳined by empirical criteria, as Wade had asserted so confĳidently earlier
in the book, it really is just a subjective judgment
call. The diffferences between groups are so subtle
and gradual that no objective lines can be drawn,
so Wade draws his own on the basis of his own preconceptions. In other words, he can’t defĳine distinct
races. He just knows them when he sees them.
There is a great deal more in this book that
deserves critique, such as Wade’s assertion that
the genetic diffferences between human groups
determine behavioral diffferences, resurrecting the
specter of “national character” and “racial temperaments.” But as I have shown here, it’s all pseudoscientifĳic rubbish because he can’t justify his fĳirst
and primary point: that the human racial groups
we recognize today are scientifĳically meaningful,
distinct biological divisions of humans.
Finally, it is worth noting that, throughout
the book, Wade repeatedly calls attention to the
fact that his view on race is contrary to that of
anthropologists and sociologists. In responses to
criticisms of his book (including an earlier online
version of this review) he insists that “by denying
the existence of race, social scientists are intimidating biologists from pursuing this path” (Wade
2014)—a claim belied by the robust criticism of
his book by geneticists, evolutionary biologists, and
physical anthropologists). This ploy is a variation
on the Galileo fallacy: the fact that one bravely
holds a minority view in science is considered to be
sufffĳicient evidence of the worth of one’s position. I
have seen it used over and over again in responses
to criticisms of pseudoscience, and it is no more
persuasive for Wade than it is for creationists or
homeopaths.
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